A democratic deficit is the difference between an ideal democratic government, as perceived by the citizens, and the actual government itself. The concept originated from debates regarding institutions of the European Union, many of which lacked the levels of accountability and transparency expected from the democratic states they represented. The concern over democratic deficits eventually spread to other multilateral organizations (MLOs) such as the United Nations (Norris 2011, 5). While many believe that MLOs necessarily hinder domestic democracy, Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik (KMM) (2009) think otherwise. They believe that MLOs can enhance domestic democracy (Keohane et al. 2009, 2).
KMM believe that many critics fail to recognize the democratic benefits of MLOs due to their narrow conceptions of domestic democracy. For their argument, KMM focus on the principles of constitutional democracy which extend beyond popular participation (Keohane et al. 2009, 5). According to Fleiner and Fleiner (2009), constitutional democracy is more than simply a “pure expression of the power of the majority.” It is a system that is constrained by constitutional rights which must be protected (Fleiner and Fleiner 2009, 269). KMM build upon this definition. They believe that checks and balances as well as remote institutions such as MLOs can enhance constitutional democracy by combating special interests, protecting vulnerable minorities, and fostering collective deliberation (Keohane et al. 2009, 9).
Gartzke and Naoi (GN) (2011) take issue with many of the claims made by KMM. One of their fundamental criticisms is that KMM view representation as a minor component of democracy—not the defining feature. By doing so, they downplay the problem of having non-elected officials in MLOs (Gartzke and Naoi 2011, 590). KMM respond to this criticism by arguing that GN conflate the concepts of popular participation and representation (Keohane et al. 2011, 601). KMM assert that while MLO’s frequently reduce popular participation, they are more resistant to factions than domestic governments and can be better equipped to support the interests of the general public (Keohane et al. 2011, 602). KMM’s defense is convincing, as it is logical for democratic nations to resist conforming to the will of the majority. After all, if the US was under complete majoritarian rule, legalized segregation would likely still exist and diversity would be significantly limited.
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After discussing popular participation, KMM describe the ways in which MLOs support constitutional democracy. The first way is by combating special interests, such as trade interest groups, that can take advantage of citizens. KMM assert the US Constitution intended to limit protectionist policies amongst states by delegating trade power to Congress. It was only after The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, however, that trade became truly liberalized and democratic (Keohane et al. 2009, 9). KMM believe that this was the result of a shift in trade power to insulated leaders such as the president as well as, more recently, MLOs.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been effective in restricting states to a series of multilateral rules that reflect public interests. KMM believe that these restrictions and norms, such as the principle of reciprocity, reduce the power of factions and protectionist groups and better represent the diffuse interests of the public (Keohane et al. 2009, 10). GN refute these claims by stating that both the RTAA and the WTO were initially created to help factions; therefore, the public benefits were unintended side-effects (Gartzke and Naoi 2011, 596). GN’s criticisms fall short, however because, as KMM note, special interests are not the same as factions. Madisonian theory clearly states that organized interests are only factions if they go against the interests of the general public. Therefore, even if initiatives are initially intended to benefit special interests, this does not mean that they necessarily support factions or hinder domestic constitutional democracy (Keohane et al. 2011, 602).
In addition to combating special interests, KMM assert that MLOs benefit domestic democracy by protecting vulnerable minorities (Keohane et al. 2009, 9). MLOs ultimately serve as supplemental tools to domestic courts. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has issued over a thousand enforced judgments. The World Bank and the International Labor Organization have also helped to protect the rights of indigenous people. Finally, international human rights commitments have helped leaders to force beneficial changes in domestic politics (Keohane et al. 2009, 17). In response to this argument, GN criticize KMM for confusing the procedural aspects of democracy with positive welfare outcomes.
Furthermore, GN assert that because there are national governments as well as NGOs that provide social benefits, there is no reason to believe that MLOs are necessary to support domestic democracy through welfare (Gartzke and Naoi 2011, 591). Unfortunately, GN’s criticisms are not based on the constitutional understanding of democracy clearly established by KMM. GN fail to recognize that human rights must be protected under this definition. Furthermore, KMM never assert that MLOs are the best avenues for welfare promotion as GN imply. Such generalized claims would require further empirical analysis (Keohane et al. 2011, 601).
The final way MLOs can enhance domestic constitutional democracy, according to KMM, is by fostering collective collaboration (Keohane et al. 2009, 9). They believe that these institutions allow for a wider and more diverse set of issues to be discussed. Furthermore, the political insulation of MLOs can help reduce bias when disseminating information (Keohane et al. 2009, 18). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, has provided the world with reliable information on climate change for decades (Keohane et al. 2009, 19). KMM note that other MLOs distribute information regarding the world economy. The International Organization of Securities Commissioners, for example, coordinates research on securities regulation (Keohane et al. 2009, 20).
KMM provide a convincing argument that MLOs are not inherently harmful to domestic democracy and can even bolster it. While GN attempt to debate this point, they fall short due to several reasons. First, GN misconstrue KMM’s argument by failing to distinguish between factions and special interests, between popular participation and representation, and between constitutional democracy and majoritarian rule. They also falsely accuse KMM of presenting multilateralism as the best method of improving democracy. Finally, and most importantly, GN fail to recognize the true scope of KMM’s argument. KMM are not attempting to prove that MLOs always bolster democracy.
In fact, they consistently assert that in depth empirical research is necessary to determine the specific effect of MLOs on a case by case basis (Keohane et al. 2011, 603). They are simply attempting to disprove the popular belief that MLOs never positively contribute to domestic democracy. To do so, KMM provide several empirical examples that are sufficient to make their baseline argument. While GN provide a similar amount of evidence, the scope of their argument is significantly greater as they assert that MLOs necessarily undermine democracy. As KMM logically point out, such a generalized claim requires far more evidence than is provided by GN (Keohane et al. 2011, 603).
References
- Fleiner, Thomas, and Lidija R. B. Fleiner. 2008. Constitutional democracy in a multicultural and globalized world. Berlin; London: Springer.
- Gartzke, Erik, and Megumi Naoi. 2011. “Multilateralism and Democracy: A Dissent Regarding Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik.” International Organization 65 (3): 589-598.
- Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2009. “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism.” International Organization 63 (1): 1-31.
- Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2011. “Constitutional Democracy and World Politics: A Response to Gartzke and Naoi.” International Organization 65 (3): 599-604.
- Norris, Pippa. 2011. Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press.
