Table of Contents
Introduction
Scientific realism assumes that our scientific theories provide us with an approximate, if not an absolute, description of mind-independent reality (MIR) (Psillos 1999: xix). If true, then it follows our observations must be sufficiently accurate, generally speaking, for our theories to be. No matter how often they are verified, however, the fact that scientists agree that their observations are veridical does not necessarily mean that they are. Whether an observation is veridical is not the same thing as agreeing that it is so.
If we grant that our observations are sufficiently accurate, then natural selection would have had to have shaped a perceptual system capable of yielding veridical observations2. Perceptual scientists do agree the human perceptual apparatus, in the typical case, yields accurate perceptions of MIR (Hoffman et al. 2015:1480-1481). Much like Jeske and Kuznar (2001:383) however, if our perceptions and by extension, our observations ground our scientific theories then perceptual veridicality “… needs to be demonstrated, rather than assumed”.
This paper will present evidence that our theories cannot be veridical because our perceptual systems could not have evolved to produce veridical perceptions. If our perceptual apparatus cannot yield veridical observations, then it follows that our scientific theories cannot be veridical either. The paper will interpret Jeske and Kuznar (2001) through the lens of scientific realism, the epistemic standard in science, then, in light of the evidence presented, will reinterpret the study.
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Using middle-range theory (MRT), Jeske and Kuznar (2001) challenged the presumption that pit forms at archaeological sites are culturally produced by introducing the possibility that dogs might have played a role in the disposition of these forms. Using a tool of MRT, the ethnographic analogy, they experimentally tested that hypothesis. They examined whether dog digging behavior observed in the ethnographic space could confound the presumption that these pit forms were wholly human-produced.
Scientific Realism
Middle-range theory (MRT) is a set of methodologies associated with the processualist school (Atici 2006:30). Processual archaeology, the then new archaeology, was an intellectual movement that sought to overturn the culture-historical method that had defined the field to date (Schmidt 1939:12). Taking its cue from the natural sciences, it advocated for a more scientific approach, reformulated the field along these lines, and adopted logical positivism as its philosophy (Earle and Preucel 1987:501).
Positivism assumes there is a MIR governed by immutable laws (Guba and Lincoln 1994:111), maintains that we have direct access to these constructs (Levy 2006:375), and affirms on principle that it offers us the best chance to converge upon a true and veridical understanding of MIR (Guba and Lincoln 1994:109).
A principle associated with the processualist school is uniformitarianism (Lyell 1830-1833, Lyell in Cameron 1993:42). It presumes site formation processes responsible for pit forms in the ethnographic record generalize to corresponding forms in the archaeological record. More consistent with a postpositivist position (Guba and Lincoln 1994:110) however, Kuznar and Jeske (2006:39) do not assert this. They instead conclude canines were the probable agent behind commonly reported pit forms and likely bioturbated the disposition of human-dug pits as well (Jeske and Kuznar 2001:38).
Inasmuch as MRT is identified with processualism and, by extension, naïve realism , the epistemology described above is more consistent with critical realism (Guba and Lincoln 1994:111) as it does not, unlike naïve realism , assume that MIR can be perfectly described. Though critical realism, like naive realism, assumes the existence of a MIR, it only presumes at best an imperfect apprehension of it (Guba and Lincoln 1994:109); in this case, an imperfect (or probabilistic) apprehension of the generative mechanisms behind the pit forms at issue. The authors, accordingly, do not argue for “… for a perfect analogy, an unobtainable isomorphism between our dog holes and prehistorically dug holes” (Kuznar and Jeske 2006:39).
Accordingly, Hoffman et al. (2015: 1483) define critical realism as a perceptual strategy , “… for which X, a set of perceptual experiences, need not be a subset of W, a set of world states, but the mapping (P) is nevertheless a homomorphism that preserves all structures on W” (Hoffman et al. 2015: 1483). In other words, the patterns of relations among perceptions are presumed to preserve “… the relations between states in the objective world” (Hoffman et al. 2015: 1483).
Scientific realism can alternatively assume a naïve or critical realist stance (Barseghyan et al. 2020). The latter, however, is currently the most widely accepted position in science today (Hoffman 2019: 67)
