The catastrophe on Yarnell Hill began around dinner time one afternoon on June 28, 2013, when several fires were ignited by lightning. After years of drought that made the state of Arizona feel like a furnace, 20 wildland firefighters, named the “Granite Mountain Hotshots,” were making their hike on the hills of Yarnell.
Without the slightest knowledge that they would be entrapped and lose their lives in the greatest tragedy and the most fatal incident of the US firefighters since September 11, 2001. It will go down in history as the most fatal, as the deadliest wildfire in Arizona. Unknowing to them, only one would survive and return home to his family. Only one would have to outlive his brothers and deal with the pain of losing his whole crew.
The State of Arizona employed a Serious Accident Investigation Team of experts to investigate the fire and the cause of the nineteen fire fighter fatalities. The team reconstructed events, conducted interviews, collected photographs, videos, audio, dispatch logs, maps and any other data that could assist them in the investigation process.
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The extremely hot weather was only getting worse on that late June afternoon. The unceasing high temperatures, the immense fuel loading, and the increasingly low fuel moisture conditions created an extreme wildfire danger environment. A few days earlier, on June 25th an excessive heat watch was issued over the state of Arizona by the National Weather service. In the long days to follow, strong winds reached over 22mph and erratically spread the fire, with the drought contributing to the danger as temperatures reached 101 °F.
The fire started in a boulder field of one and a half acre, however, because of the terrain being so steep, there was no possible vehicle access. Since it was already late afternoon and the first responders saw only a minimum amount of fire activity and potential to spread, protocol was followed. According to the 18 “Watch Out” situations to not go out in the country if the fire hasn’t been evaluated during the daylight, there were concerns about placing firefighters on the hill overnight. Considering these factors, the Incident Commander decided to wait till the morning to go up on the hill and suppress the fire.
After the fire ignited at 5:36pm on June 28th, it spread with aggressive speed and no signs of stopping. On June 30th the winds increased and pushed the fire over containment lines. There was a shift in the wind that was heading northeast, shifting aggressively into the southwest direction towards Yarnell Hill. That day the fire went from 300 acres to over 2,000 acres and by July 1st the fire spread and grew to over 8,300 acres.
The actions and assignment of the Granite Mountain Hotshots was to create an anchor at the heel of the fire and create a fire line. Some time later however, due to the changing weather conditions with winds shifting from the northeast to the southwest, the fire resources changed direction. The focus was now on evacuating the town of approximately 700 residents located northeast of Pheonix and protecting the structures of the town. Meanwhile, the operating chief in charge confirmed with the Hotshots that they heard the reports and were safe. The Granite Mountain Headshot crew had an appointed lookout, in accordance to the first letter in LACES acronym, that would be positioned where he is able to see the fire, the fire line, and the crew.
After a while, the lookout reported that the fire’s trigger points had been reached and he was relocating to safety. Due to the size of the fire there may be reason to appoint more than one lookout, but the Hotshots didn’t, leaving only one lookout with all the responsibility for such a large fire. This could possibly be a “watch out” situation because they did not size up the fire enough to appoint more than one lookout. The lookout was also not aware, which is the next letter in LACES, of the crew’s plan and actions so communication was not ideal in this situation, which causes a domino effect and brings us to the 3rd letter. During the next 33 minutes no one had communicated with the Hotshot crew and one of the 10 firefighting orders which is to maintain prompt communication was not followed.
The personnel that was communicating with the Granite Mountain Hotshots assumed that they would stay in the black, however the Hotshots left the black and headed southeast. Another “watch out” example here because the crew did not communicate with their supervisor in regards to leaving their known location. Not even 30 minutes later, thunderstorms reached the south edge of the fire, winds increased and overran the Hotshots. At this point the Accident Investigation Report Team cannot find much direct communication from the crew of Hotshots. This communication gap may be there reason why the fatalities happened.
The team came to the conclusion that there were three phases during these 33 minutes that were of significant importance. The crew’s movement southeast when they left the black, it is not known why they chose this option, but the best assumption is that they thought this route will place them in a better position to re-engage later on during the fire. However this sounds like a frontal attempt on the fire and is another “watch out” situation which they should’ve kept in mind.
Their descent off the ridge through a box canyon towards the Boulder Springs Ranch is a 2nd phase that the team pointed out. It may be that the Ranch appeared closer than it actually was, according to witness interviews that’s how it usually appeared to the public. Walking through unburned fuel between them and the fire however, was also a situation that they should’ve “watched out” for.
And lastly, their descent obstructed their view of the fire and they were not able to see changes in fire intensity or the speed and direction of the fire and winds. They were also unable to see changes in the smoke column after they headed down the hill. Being unable to see the fire, especially when not in communication with the look out, or someone else that has view of the fire is a dangerous position to be in and every firefighter should watch out when finding himself in such a position.
Once they got to a small opening and realized that the fire was more advanced than they thought, their escape route was cut off and the only option that made sense was to deploy their shelter and hope to survive that way. This is the 4th letter of LACES, and it is unfortunate that the crew didn’t have multiple options for escape routes, just in case one got cut off, like it did. The crew also had a safety zone to retrieve to but as we already know, they were unable to reach it in their time of need.
Due to the fire entrapping the whole crew, there is much that is unknown about the actions and decisions of the crew during those precious 30 minutes. What is known though is that after they left the black, the Hotshots travelled through an unburned area towards the safety zone near the Boulder Spring Ranch. However, because of the thunderstorm and the rapid speed of the fire that was approximately 10-12mph, the crew was unable to reach the safety zone or to reach the rim of the canyon, their escape route was cut off and they were trapped from all sides.
When communication was made again the crew reported that they were deploying on the south side of the fire. Due to the conditions, the crew had barely 2 minutes for improving a deployment site which was definitely not enough time, and the fire overtook them while they were deploying fire shelters. With temperatures exceeding 2000°F not one of the crew members from the site survived to tell of their reasoning and why they took such actions. After the fire was put out, preliminary investigation done, and search parties sent out, the 19 Hotshot bodies were found. Their bodies were found only one mile away from their last known location.
After hearing that the crew of Hotshots were deploying, the operations team immediately began efforts to try to locate the Granite Mountain Hotshots. Ground crews were sent out in search for the crew and the circling air tanker was told to hold a drop for the crew’s protection in case they were found. Unfortunately the efforts to locate the crew were not successful until approximately two hours later when they were spotted by a helicopter crew, where a field paramedic confirmed that all 19 had perished.
The conclusion of the team was that because of the lack of communication it is almost impossible to identify concrete lessons learned from the actions of the crew. However, the team was able to draw some general conclusions that are parallel to the 10 firefighting orders, 18 “Watch Outs” and LACES. The team concluded that the Granite Mountain Hotshots were fully qualified, trained, and followed all standards and guidelines.
They also pointed out that the Yarnell Hill had not burned for over 45 years and it was primed to burn because of the extreme drought and weather conditions. The team recognized that radio communication was poor and crews had to troubleshoot so that they would be able to communicate. Also the characteristics of the fire made it complicated due to the rapid fire spread and increase in a very short time making it challenging for all fire resources to keep up.
Although the Headshots were watching the fire the whole time, according to the 2nd firefighting order to know what your fire is doing at all times, they were not able to anticipate the approaching outflow boundary and the significant changes in the fire behavior. The change in wind behavior is another “watch out” situation that possibly made the crew more aware of their position, which may be the reason why they attempted to locate to another area. The crew was also following the 3rd standard order, basing their actions on expected fire behavior, by trying to reposition themselves in a place to better reengage with the fire.
Another conclusion made by the team was that the Aerial Supervision Module was too busy fulfilling lead plane duties instead of performing full Air Attack responsibilities. Even though during some of the time aircrafts were not available due to adverse weather, an air tanker was over the fire waiting to drop retardant when the Granite Mountain Crew was located. The team didn’t find any evidence of negligence, recklessness or violations of policy/protocol.
References
- US Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station – Yarnell Hill Fire
- Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center – WLF Division Supervisor Captain Hero: Firefighter Brendan McDonough, Survivor of the Yarnell Hill Disaster, June 30, 2013
- The Arizona Republic – Yarnell Hill Fire: A look back at the deadly wildfire near Prescott
