The trolley problem explains how amoralists, or people without moral standards, challenge the objectivity of moral reason. The trolley problem generally puts a person in a difficult moral dilemma, but the argument is raised that there are people who will act differently in the situation, which begs the argument there are any genuine moral reasons for our actions. According to Williams, amoralists do not make decisions for what we believe to be moral reasons (ex. equality) as most people do. Therefore they cannot experience resentment or the thought that it would be wrong to interfere with one’s own life. Similarly, amoralists cannot take pride in their courageousness since these are moral values. Williams asks the question, “What is the amoralist really like?”. He likens a gangster; someone with no sense of fairness where they may have no regard for life in a professional sense, but may show concern for their child, or parent.
Subjectivism is a theory that our consciousness, or experiences and perceptions is our perceived reality, dependent and different for each individual. Williams believes that moral opinions or our judgments are merely subjective, or based on a personal opinion. Williams hypothesizes that if moral judgments were autobiographical reports about our attitudes, which seems to be a logical form of subjectivism. Using the organ donor example, one might claim that killing one person to save five is wrong. Another person may believe killing someone is justifiable, under certain circumstances. One is not opposed to the action, while someone else is; yet these statements are consistent with each other. Williams believes this scenario to be implausible, considering moral disagreement.
Nagel suggests that there are two types of potential reasons for actions. The first, Agent-Relative reasons, which are considerations that provide one agent with reasons, but do not provide other agents with reasons. The other is Agent-Neutral reasons, which Nagel explains as considerations that provide all agents with reasons for action. Nagel uses pain (which causes actions) to illustrate the distinction between these two types of reasons. Agent-Relative reason for action is egoistic or self-centered. In other terms, my pain causes me to act to to stop the pain, but gives other people no reason to do anything. Pain as an Agent-Neutral reason for action is altruistic or selfless. For example, other people may feel obligated to help you when you are in pain due to their moral obligations. Nagel concluded that there are Agent-Neutral reasons, of a moral character and that not all reasons are Agent-Relative.
Street thinks evolution provides a potentially undermining explanation of the origins of our most basic normative views or independent truths. For example, many value their health and survival of their children. This belief is hypothesized to have begun evolutionarily, as in those with this belief were more likely to survive and have their species continue. Street’s evolutionary argument is alternatively argued since evolution may have given people strong behavioral tendencies, or powerful emotional drives and desires, but not necessarily beliefs. These tendencies explain basic facts about our biological nature, which are needed for normative reflection, but evolution does not explain our normative beliefs. Street’s evolutionary explanation and the normative judgments also don’t take into account that biologically, the survival of genetic information should be most important. Though many people care about their friend’s survival and health, even without children (carrying on genes/DNA). Evolution does not directly explain our normative beliefs as Street believes, but rather explains facts about our biological nature, which are important for normative reflection.