The question as to whether states should intervene to save strangers is one that has been debated for many years. There are many aspects that need to be examined when researching this question such as the different theories that can be investigated (English School, Realism and Liberalism) as well as factors such as the success theory, the morality and legality of interventions, the Responsibility to Protect and the successes and failures of interventions. These factors will help determine whether states military have an obligation to intervene to save strangers.
One argument against states intervening to save strangers is the success condition. This examines how successful previous interventions or wars have been and look at the likelihood of the success of the intervention in question. If there is a low possibility of success, in theory, the state will not intervene. In practice however, this is not always the case. The condition states that interventions are permissible only if the risks they create for others can be permissibly imposed on them (Debating Humanitarian Intervention, Should We Try to Save Strangers?, Fernando Tesón and Bas van der Vossen, 2018). This essentially means that morally just interventions have a high chance of success, making the dangers that could come to fruition acceptable. This can be seen as a way of working out the likelihood of success of an intervention and also a way of justifying whether said intervention is moral. This suggests that the Success Condition can mean that saving strangers is necessary, but only if the risks are not too grave, the likelihood of success is high, and the intervention is morally correct.
The English School theory is one which could help us answer the question at hand. The central idea of the English School is that there is more to international relations than realists tell us and less than the cosmopolitans desire’ (Andrew Linklater). It suggests that states should form an international community, with common interests and norms. There are also factions within this school of thought, such as English School Pluralism and English School Solidarism. These different ideas of the same theory can give us an insight into whether states should save strangers.
127 our experts are availableright now
English School Pluralists prioritise state sovereignty and non-intervention. This straight away means that they don’t believe that a state intervention in order to save strangers is necessary. They believe that elites within organisations such as the UN represent humanity, therefore they should be the actors intervening rather than states, who should focus on themselves rather than individuals or groups. The Garden Analogy can be used here to strengthen this point. ‘Every State has the right to maintain its own garden without interference from the next-door neighbour. Each state should be allowed to tend their own patch without being ‘unduly concerned about unwarranted interference by neighbours or other outsiders’ (Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant, 2000, 410). The English School Pluralists could also argue that military interventions do not work, which is another reason why they believe saving strangers is unnecessary. The interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 are major examples of this on account of the lives lost during the conflict, and the results not being as they had hoped when the intervention was planned.
English School Solidarism suggests that if a crime or humanitarian crisis occurs in another state, that all states must come together and intervene to help the situation. In the 1980’s, pluralists such as Bull and Vincent saw that prioritising Order over Justice saw Apartheid and Starvation go unchallenged in South Africa. Solidarists also believe that non interventions do not work. For example, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 which saw countless innocent lives lost due to an intervention not occurring. English School Solidarists also follow the Responsibility to Protect, as well as the UN Charter Preamble which states: ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’. This clearly demonstrates that they believe all lives to be equal, regardless of whether they are strangers or in the population of their own state, thus meaning in their view, states should intervene in order to save strangers.
Following on from the above point, we must examine the Responsibility to Protect when answering this question is. Becoming relevant in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome document, it ‘refers to the obligation of states toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes’. There are three pillars to this. The first says that states have the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing; the second states that the wider international community has the responsibility to aide and assist states in meeting that responsibility and the third is that the international community must be prepared to take the necessary collective action if a state is failing to protect its population against any of the above. Clearly the Responsibility to Protect indicates that states have a collective interest to protect the population of other states, meaning that military intervention in order to save strangers is encouraged if needed.
However, despite outlining ways in which states should intervene to save strangers, it does not always happen. For example, Syria since 2011 has been widely noted as a test case for the Responsibility to Protect. With over 100,000 civilian deaths, 2 million refugees and 2.5 million people internally displaced, the test is believed to be a failure. Ekkehard Strauss, a UN official whose former appointments include service with the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide wrote on his blog in 2012: “Syria today seems to confirm the concern held by many that the R2P is the emperor’s new clothes, unable to cover even the most basic nakedness of an international system unable to deal with mass atrocities.’ John Western and Joshua Goldstein state in the political journal In Foreign Affairs that “R2P has failed to prevent mass slaughter in Syria.” Both above quotes clearly show that the Responsibility to Protect has failed in Syria, and possibly takes some credibility away from the principle, as states military should have intervened to save strangers, but have not done so. Patrick Stewart, a leading American commentator based at the Council on Foreign Relations argued that the UN Security Council’s failure to reach a consensus on Syria had put R2P itself “in a major crisis” which backs up this point.
With regards to Syria, it could be argued that small interventions can have negative impacts rather than fulfil their aim to save strangers. Although not a full military intervention, Barack Obama approved plans to bomb Syria via airstrikes in 2016 in the areas in which they believed the Islamic State had strongholds. These airstrikes took many civilian lives, so it could easily be argued that the action did the opposite of saving strangers, but instead was the cause of their death. However, it could be argued that these airstrikes did achieve their aim in the fact that the US government believed that key Islamic State fighters were killed, so the question arises as to whether civilian life loss is acceptable in order to achieve the wider aim?
Liberalism is another view point from which we can discuss whether states military should intervene to save strangers. Liberalism, political doctrine that takes protecting and enhancing the freedom of the individual to be the central problem of politics. Liberals typically believe that government is necessary to protect individuals from being harmed by others, but they also recognise that government itself can pose a threat to liberty. This definition states that liberals believe the government to have the responsibility to protect individuals from harm. This should translate to individuals in their own state, as well as individuals who can be classed as strangers. Liberals hope that humanitarian intervention will address the great powers’ unwillingness to abandon those suffering helplessly at the hands of oppressive regimes. Regardless of legalilty, Nardin (2006) reminds us that we have a ‘moral duty to act when institutions fail. That is the lesson of Rwanda. No institution can be counted on to make moral judgement unnecessary’ (p25-26). This suggests that from the point of view of liberalism, states have rights to protect individuals, meaning that they believe states military should intervene to save strangers in every possible occasion, regardless of legality.
When looking at this question, realism is another view which needs to be considered. Realists are traditionally hostile towards any intervention that has ethical motivations. They state that interventions are guided by political interests so can never be purely moral actions. Smith (1998) says that they are unable to act in other than self-interested ways’ (p70), which clearly backs up this point. Therefore, realist thinkers generally believe that interventions should not occur, so states should not intervene to save strangers. However, one can look at quasi-realism, where arguments for interventions can be formulated. In order for this to happen, the idea of national interest must be broadened. For example the US National Security Strategy 2002 states: As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organisations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organisations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbours, and provide a haven for terrorists (p7). This shows that although realism on the whole disagrees with the military intervening to save strangers, by broadening the concept of national interest, there is some scope for saving strangers.
The before mentioned wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can be examples of why states military should not intervene to save strangers. The UK and the USA went to war with these countries as they believed that the Iraq president Saddam Hussain was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat of the terrorist group Al Qaeda in the country. The war in Afghanistan was also for the purpose of eradicating the terrorist organisation. The war in Iraq specifically could indicate that states military should not intervene to save strangers, as the information that they had on the weapons of mass destruction was not fully reliable, so the war was started on the grounds of possibility rather than certainty, which led to the loss of countless lives. It can be argued that the UK and the USA were operating in their own interests rather than what was best for the countries they intervened in.
For example, it could be argued that the UK blindly followed the USA into war, as the Prime Minister at the time Tony Blair wanted to keep the special relationship between the two nations as strong as possible. Therefore, it can be said in this case that states military should not intervene to save strangers, especially at the cost of lives of their own population, as well as the fact that there was no proper intelligence to intervene in the first place and acting in their own interests rather than for the good of strangers. the conflict had killed 179 U.K. troops, almost 4,500 U.S. personnel and more than 100,000 Iraqis – Britain’s former Prime Minister Tony Blair is accused of dragging the U.K. into war in Iraq and blindly following the U.S, Tony Blair under fire over decision to declare war on Iraq, 2011
Next, we must examine the morality and legality of states military intervening to save strangers. A defence of many non-interventions is that the act would be immoral or illegal. Why intervene in Kosovo on behalf of the Albanians, but not for the East Timorese, the Turkish Kurds, the Tibetans or the Chechens? (Adam Groves, Can Armed Intervention to Save Strangers be Morally Justified?, 2007.) Groves goes on to say that many humanitarian crises occur ‘in backwaters of no strategic significance… [to] the major players’ (Hoffman, 2003: 23). This leads to ‘agreed moral principle[s]’ being neglected because ‘national interest dictates a divergence of response’ (Wheeler and Bellamy, 2001: 474). Suggesting selectivity seems to undermine the moral legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.
The legitimacy of states military interventions to save strangers remains open for debate. Even if such interventions are gradually becoming accepted as customary international law, how do we decide when such an intervention is justified? Who has the authority to authorise it? What would justify a violation of the principle of non-intervention in the first place (Misha Seay, 2007). This statement suggests that even if a state feels that it should intervene in another state in order to save strangers, there are more questions that need answering before the intervention can occur.
This means that the answer to the question is not simply a yes or no outcome, but one with various questions that need answering and agreeing upon in order for action to be taken. Rwanda can be seen as an example of this. Due to the political dilemmas and stalemates, the Security Council did not table a resolution to stop the violence, leading to the deaths of several hundred thousand Tutsis (Mosley and Norman 2002). After the non-intervention in Rwanda, a group of states under the branch of NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo when the Security Council failed to authorise the use of force (Orford 2003), suggesting that states should intervene to save strangers, as said states took it upon themselves to intervene in the country.
The intervention in Kosovo divided opinion between those who saw it to be illegal, due to the Security Council not authorising it, and those who saw it as morally necessary, despite the question of legality. Seay asks which do we obey first? Morality or law? Nardin argues that both ‘principles and institutions are contested, uncertain, and abused. One appeals to procedures when people cannot agree on principles, and to principles when institutions are unjust or ineffective’ (p25). Legitimacy must be considered when looking at interventions, not just legality, as factors such as who wants to intervene and their motives for intervention could help to decide whether the intervention is necessary, and could highlight whether the intervention reflects the interests of the great powers rather than legal or moral principles.
In conclusion I believe that states military should not intervene to save strangers. The main reason for this comes from a realist point of view, that the one of the big reasons for states military intervening to save strangers if for selfish reasons, and in their own interests rather than the interests of the state in need of help. Also, the fact that many interventions have ended poorly, with the example of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, means the risks associated with saving strangers far outweighs the benefits of saving them. Despite the fact that non-interventions do not work, which is demonstrated by the lives lost in the Rwandan genocide, it is far safer for states military not to intervene in order to preserve the lives of its own, rather than risk them to save strangers. On the other hand, it can be seen that interventions do work, shown by the one that occurred in Kosovo, but just because there are aspects of success, it does not mean that states have an obligation to save strangers.
