Table of Contents
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore the events of Continental Airlines flight 1404. On December 20, 2008, Continental Airlines flight 1404 took off from the left side of runway 34R at Denver International Airport (DEN), in Colorado, heading to George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Texas. The aircraft was a Boeing 737-500. Due to stronger than anticipated winds, the aircraft veered left off of the runway on takeoff roll, resulting in the injury of 47 people. The determined cause of this accident was the inadequate right rudder input by the captain to rival a strong and gusting crosswind. More contributing factors to this accident are lack of crosswind training in the airline industry and an air traffic control system that did not provide air traffic controllers as well as pilots with important wind information. The fate of the aircraft was written off as damaged beyond repair. The purpose of this case study is to explore some of the different factors of the accident in order to inform the public, as well as try to avoid this from happening again.
This case study provides information on the crash of Continental Airlines flight 1404, taking place on December 20, 2008. The flight was scheduled to be flown from Denver International Airport to George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Texas. Before the aircraft could become airborne, the jet veered off the left side of runway 34R due to a high and gusting crosswind. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the cause of the incident was the pilots lack of right rudder input, as well as other contributing factors. The pilots arrived at Denver International Airport (DEN) at at about 1700 Mountain Standard Time (MST).
After both pilots (the captain and the first officer) were in the cockpit, they performed typical departure procedures. The pilots received the clearances that they needed to taxi, and were instructed to monitor the DEN air traffic control tower (ATCT) for weather and updates. The pilots got a reading of wind from a heading of 270 at 27 knots at 1817 MST. The assigned departure heading for the aircraft was 020. The pilots had recognized that their published crosswind guideline was 33 knots, so they believed they were ok to takeoff. With inadequate crosswind information from the ATC system, the pilots did not realize that they would be encountering a wind stronger than 27 knots. The captain and the first officer took care of all of their required procedures. All checklist items were hit, all callouts were verbally spoken, and all systems were functional, or in the safe operation zone. As the airplane was lined up on the runway, the sound of the engines getting louder and louder (indicating throttle input) was recorded by the cockpit voice recorder at 1817. The pilots focused their attention on where they were supposed to.
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The first officer informed the captain that the plane had reached 90.9% power, as the captain instructed him to, at 1818. Once the aircraft reached approximately 55 knots, the airplane started to veer left a little bit, due to a greater than anticipated crosswind. The flight data recorder was able to record the actions that follow. The captain began to make right rudder inputs, to combat the crosswind. The first input of right rudder was a substantial 88% of its possible forward travel. Then, by 1818:09 the captain reduced the rudder pressure to 15%. The flight data recorded than captured a left control wheel input from the pilots.
With this, the airplane began to regain a heading to the right. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (2010), at 1818:10, as the airplane was accelerating through about 85 knots, the airplane’s nose reversed direction and began moving back to the left at a rate of about 1° per second. The left turning of the aircraft continued for approximately 2 seconds before the captain inputed another large right rudder placement (NTSB, 2010). This right rudder placement reached a highest input of 72% of available rudder as the aircraft traveled at 90 knots and occurred at 1818:11.
This rudder input was then decreased to 33% at 1818:13. As the pilot inputed the right rudder a second time, the leftward turning of the aircraft relaxed for about 1 second. Right after, the aircraft starting veering to the right again. The main issue here is that the the use of control wheel and right rudder become little to none. The captain did make a small right rudder input at 1818:14, but it was not substantial enough. After this, there was no records of rudder input recorded by the flight data recorded. The aircraft reportedly left the runway at 1818:15 as the flight data recorder began to pickup more and more background noise. The captain pulled back the power, applied the brakes, and activated the thrust reverses as he called the reject of the attempted takeoff.
The audience can see that the pilots were aware and knew their procedures in this instance as they needed to act fast in response to this situation. The aircraft left runway 34R on the left side, about 2,600 feet from the approach end of the runway. The aircraft then proceeded to travel across taxiway WC and then across an airport service road. The aircraft lost electrical power as it was still traveling at 90 knots. According to reports, the aircraft hit uneven terrain, resulting in the jet becoming airborne and then coming back down to the ground in a hard manner. The aircraft halted on a 315 heading, just North of DEN.
Aircraft Information
The aircraft in the accident was a Boeing 737-500. It had a tail number of N18611, and a serial number of 27324. This jet aircraft was manufactured in 1994 by Boeing. The aircraft had a total of 40,541 hours of flight during the time of the accident, according to Continental Airline records. The aircraft had two CFM56-3B1 engines . The right engine had less than 30,000 hours of operational time, and the left engine had less than 40,000 hours of operational time. Each of the engines as well as the aircraft and it’s controls had all underwent proper maintenance and complied with all FAA regulations to make it legal as well as safe for flight.
The aircraft had winglets installed in November 2008. The alteration was approved by Continental Airlines maintenance standards as well as FAA regulations on December 6, 2008. According to company documents and post-accident calculations, the airplane’s takeoff weight for the accident flight was about 116,900 pounds, and the calculated center of gravity (cg) was 21.5 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC); both parameters were within the required limits (NTSB, 2010).
According to AeroInside (2018), the Boeing 737-500 currently has 125 incidents on file. Compare this to the Airbus A320 with 1487 incidents on file (AeroInside, 2018). This example demonstrates that the Boeing 737-500 has a relatively low incident count. According to Continental Airlines and aircraft records, all aircraft systems, flight controls, and engine functions were completely operational and up to date. This fact concludes that the accident was not some sort of aircraft malfunction of any kind. The aircraft suffered great damage. A fire became present after the crash. The fate of the aircraft was written off as damaged beyond repair.
Pilot Information
Captain (Pilot in Command) The captain of flight 1404 was at an age of 50 years old. He was hired by Continental airlines on November 5, 1997. Before Continental, the pilot flew in the Navy from 1979 to 1993, accumulating about 4,500 hours. When the crash occurred, the captain had accumulated roughly 13,100 hours of flight time. 6,300 of these hours were in fact from a Boeing 737. The captain had previously flown a DC-9, Being 737, and Boeing 757/767. Thus meaning that the pilot held a type rating for each of these aircraft. The captain also had a multi-engine ATP rating, as well as a first-class medical with no restrictions. The captain was up to date on his line check (4/14/2008), his proficiency checks (10/9/2008 and 10/11/008), and had completed the Continental Airlines 2004/2005 Continuing Qualification Syllabus.
The successful completion of the syllabus is something to note as it required pilots to successfully takeoff and land in a 35 knot crosswind. It can be observed that the captain of the accident aircraft was both current and proficient. interviews.
The National Transportation Safety Board conducted multiple interviews with different pilots that worked for Continental who have flown with the captain of flight 1404. The first officer flying with the captain in flight 1404 was interviewed and spoke highly of the captain. He said that the captain was a pleasure to work with, as well as highly proficient in things such as his flying skill, technical skills, communication skills, and risk management. Two more first officers that had flown with this captain, as well as a line check airmen, all said the captain was a proficient and safe pilot. records. According to the FAA records, the captain did not have any previous issues (incidents, enforcement actions, etc…) with the FAA, nor any retakes of any tests or check rides.
Continental Airline records state that the captain of flight 1404 had proper training and did not have any performance issues. Finally, the National Driver Registrar had no record of any license suspension or revoking for the captain. The captain of flight 1404 had a clean record as shown above. First Officer (Second in Command) On the date of the crash, the first officer was 34 years old. Like the captain, the first officer held a multi-engine ATP rating. The first officer of flight 1404 started his career with Continental airlines in March of 2007. The pilot had an up to date first class medical certificate that had no restrictions. He had recently completed his line check (9/29/2008), as well as his proficiency checks (12/1/2008 and 12/2/2008). The first officer started flying in 1994 at the University of North Dakota. He moved on to be a flight instructor in 1998, then worked for Horizon Air in 1999. The pilot built up 8,000 flight hours, including 1,500 of them being in a Boeing 737. As stated above, the records and completion of checks show that the pilot was proficient in his duties. interviews. As they did with the captain, the NTSB conducted interviews with other pilots from Continental Airlines who had flown with the accident first officer.
The captain flight 1404 had flown with this first officer previously and rated his flight skills very highly. Two other captains reportedly stated that the first officer was an incredibly skilled pilot as well as being proficient in areas such as responsiveness, and professionalism. records. According to Continental Airline records, the first officer did not have any issues with training or performance. FAA records showed that the first officer did not have any kinds of issues (enforcement actions, incidents) with the FAA. The pilot also never had any check ride failures or test retakes.
Finally, according to the National Driver Registrar, the pilot did not have any license suspension. Like the captain, the first officer had a clean record.
Causes of Incident
Through investigation, the NTSB has stated that there is one main cause for the incident, as well as two contributing factors. The main cause for the incident was the pilots lack of right rudder input. This right rudder input would be needed to control the aircraft in the strong crosswind. The first contributing factor is that the air traffic control system did was not required to share important wind information with air traffic control or the pilots, resulting in a lack of knowledge on the exact wind conditions. The second contributing factor would be the lack of crosswind training in the airline industry due to inferior wind gust simulation equipment.
Overall Damage Aircraft The aircraft was severely damaged. A fire broke out after the plane had stopped. The condition was written off as damaged beyond repair. Airport A taxiway light as well as multiple reflector polls along the airport service road suffered substantial damage.
Injuries
Out of 115 people onboard flight 1404, there were 47 total injuries. There were no fatalities. pilots. The captain suffered serious injuries while the first officer only suffered minor injuries. crew members. 2 of the cabin crew members suffered minor injures. The third member did not suffer any injury. passengers. Out of the 110 passengers, 67 of them were unharmed, 38 suffered minor injuries, and 5 of them suffered serious injuries.
Conclusion
The purpose of this case study was to investigate the incident of Continental Airlines flight 1404. During the case study, many different factors such as the pilots and the aircraft were thoroughly investigated. It was concluded that while the aircraft as well as the pilots were proficient and current, the main cause for the incident was pilot error. The pilots did not use enough right rudder pressure, resulting in the loss of control of the aircraft before it could become airborne.
References
- National Transportation Safety Board. (2010). Aircraft Accident Report AAR-10-04. Retrieved from https://learn.liberty.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-26861177-dt-content-rid-322540172_1/courses/AVIA340_D03_201840/AVIA340_LUO_8WK_DEV_ImportedContent_20180907071446/Runway_Side_Excursion_During_Attempted_Takeoff.pdf
- AeroInside. (Updated 2018). Incidents involving Airbus A320. Retrieved from https://www.aeroinside.com/incidents/type/a320/airbus-a-320
- AeroInside. (Updated 2018) Incidents involving Boeing 737-500. Retrieved from https://www.aeroinside.com/incidents/type/b735/boeing-737-500
- Code7700. (2010). Continental Airlines Flight 1404 Case Study. Retrieved from http://code7700.com/accident_continental_airlines_1404.htm
