Table of Contents
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze and discuss the prior measures and continuous events in France that demonstrate the presence of anti-Muslim attitudes within the nation. The ultimate goal if this paper is to determine the several causes for Islamophobia in France and ascertain the quality of life a French Muslim can expect to have in the future. This paper will specifically examine the roles played by the Charlie Hebdo shooting, French Secularlism, and the Muslim veil ban in helping to exacerbate religious intolerance in the form of Islamophobia.
A concrete definition of Islamophobia is difficult to pinpoint and differs extensively within and between disciplines (Bleich 2012, 182). Many scholars argue that Islamophobia’s inconsistent ever-changing definition is warranted, as the concept itself is abstract and relative in nature (Bleich 2012, 182). Bleich finds that Islamophobia is best understood as “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims” (Bleich 2012, 182). As with concepts such as homophobia or xenophobia, Islamophobia denotes a large range of negative feelings or reactions specifically directed at individuals or groups due to their apparent membership in a particular category (Bleich 2012, 182).
France is generally one of the least religious countries in the world (Religious Demographics of France, 2016). The percentage of French people identifying as non-religious has exploded in the past 30 years, from 15.5% to nearly 40% today (Religious Demographics of France, 2016). French nationalism, based on the secular values of the French Republic, becomes a highly selective model that disregards religion and negates individual liberty regarding religious expression (Weill 2006, 60). The French regularly portray Muslims as the “other,” suggesting that they are somehow less than French nationals (Maxwell 2014, 161). I argue that the primary causes for the presence of Islamophobia in France can be attributed to the exclusivity of French national identity, the place of bans on the Muslim veil, and the existence of racism within French culture that emerged in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack.
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Charlie Hebdo
The 2015 attack on Charlie Hebdo proved to be one of the worst acts of terror in France’s history (Silverstein 2018, 86). It was what came in the aftermath of the shootings that ultimately led to the development of Islamophobic rhetoric (Silverstein 2018, 86). Charlie Hebdo is a satirical newspaper known for publishing contentious comics and content, with Islam being its primary target (Tourtier 2015, 843). Those who defended Charlie Hebdo claimed that the publications were an exercise of the newspaper’s right to free speech and the publications were not Islamophobic, nor were they attempting to conduct hate speech against Muslims (Silverstein 2018, 86). On the morning of January 7, 2015, two Algerian French-born brothers stormed the offices of Charlie Hebdo and opened fire on employees of the newspaper, killing 12 and injuring 11 others (Tourtier 2015, 843).
French people who lacked experience with Islam viewed the Charlie Hebdo attack as being quintessentially Islamic, rather than viewing it as a violent act committed by French-born citizens with little exposure to Islam before their subsequent conversion to a radical form of the religion (Najimdeen 2015, 88). The Charlie Hebdo attack spawned waves of Islamophobia among individuals who knew little about Islam. And, as media coverage continued, their reports confirmed and validated anti-Muslim biases (Najimdeen 2015, 88).
Here, once again, Islamophobia can be seen as a result of the media subtly portraying Muslims stereotypes and leaving the public to interpret them through their own understanding of the religion (Najimdeen 2015, 88). Historically, France has maintained highly anti-religious sentiment, which over the past ten years or so has been directed mainly towards Muslims in the state (Trench 2016, 185). While this anti-Muslim sentiment certainly heightened in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, it existed prior to the incident (Trench 2016, 186).
Secularism in France: Laïcité
In a 2011 televised interview a questioner once asked French President Nicolas Sarkozy whether he believed that multiculturalism is a failure and the cause for many of the problems in French society (Fredette 2014, 151). Sarkozy replied, “My response is a clear: yes, it is a failure. The truth is that in all our democracies, we have been too preoccupied about the identity of those arriving and not enough with that of the countries that welcome them” (Fredette 2014, 151). The French Constitution emphasizes separation of faith and society as a central pillar of French culture.
By framing religion as a superfluous aspect of individual public identity through restrictive secularism, or “laïcité,” the French people are able to enjoy a governmental system untied to religious influence (Weill 2006, 60). Consequently, however, individual religious freedom in France has been subdued by the application of secularism as normative of French identity (Weill 2006, 60). This secular self is the only identity acknowledged by the French nation. As the levels of religious pluralism increases, the idea of a single, secular identity begins to seem more and more unreasonable, leaving French citizens with little space to possess a religious identity that is not French Catholic.
As religious and cultural diversity in France surges with the arrival of various immigrant groups, reconciling religion within the state has proven difficult. Religion has historically held an inconsistent place in France. Somehow the nation is viewed as both a quintessentially Catholic nation with cathedrals aplenty among the French community, yet sharply and unmercifully secular in structure. This union of two paradoxical values existing within a single nation has assisted in developing a secular, yet ethnologically Catholic national identity that is exceedingly discriminatory toward individuals outside of these particular parameters.
In her book, Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies, Adida suggests three elements of the Muslim presence in France that contribute to the feeling that Muslims are a threat to French society (Adida 2016, 79). These elements are (1) religious norms, (2) gender norms, and (3) their mastery of the host population’s language (Adida 2016, 79). Muslim religious norms are starkly at odds with French norms, as Muslims tend to be more ostentatiously religious than their French-Christian counterparts (Adida 2016, 81). Muslims are more likely to advertise their religious affiliation in public, which is considered by many in France as an unacceptable violation of laïcité (Adida 2016, 82). Gender norms in France interpret the headscarf as a signal of female submission to male dominance and view Muslims as having less favorable attitudes toward women (Adida 2016, 89). Often Muslims lack of fluency in the French language contributes to their depiction as an outsider as well (Adida 2016, 91).
Secularism was originally implemented in France to ensure equality and eliminate religion from civic institutions. Any public showing of religious affiliation in French society was discouraged and often resulted in conflict. This stance has spurred a national debate over the Muslim veil, which was banned from public spaces in 2010. France’s two main parties, the Union for a Popular Movement and the Socialists, have joined in support of a program targeting Islamic dress in public through established mechanisms (Laxer 2019, 54-58).
Muslim Veil Ban
On 11 April 2011, the French Islamic veil ban came into force (Hunter-Henin 2012, 614). Traditionally in France, one was free to express religion as long as it did not infringe the neutrality of state, but this changed when the debate of the veil arose (Laxer 2019, 27).
A common trend within the nation provides that individuals must acclimate and conform to secularism and the French identity (Asad 2006, 500). These religious arguments have sparked a recurrence of a French Catholic nation and the unification of the French natives versus what they believe to be “other” groups that reject French cultural norms (Asad 2006, 500). French politicians opposing the veil argue that it symbolizes female submission or religious radicalism (Laxer 2019, 9). Laxer discusses how “Western” women, under the guise of feminism, have a tendency to suppress “Third World Women” and subdue Muslim women’s practices they deem antagonistic to women’s emancipation (Laxer 2019, 9).
Consequently, Western women are often viewed as elite, progressive, and more in control of their lives (Laxer 2019, 9). Anti-ban feminists respond by maintaining that restrictive laws infringe upon veiled women’s religious freedom as well as their right to their own decisions (Laxer 2019, 8). Leftist individuals are telling Muslims that they are poor citizens for being unwilling to “leave their religion in the private sphere” (Fredette 2014, 156). Muslim women are to be pitied and protected but apparently not listened to (Fredette 2014, 156).
Conversely, Tolan suggests that those who view Muslim veil laws as simply manifestations of racism or Islamophobia “fail to understand the deep historical distrust of public manifestation of religion” (Tolan 2017, 46). Hunter-Henin argues that the 2010 ban falls outside of the boundaries of the notion of laïcité, and nor is the ban about protecting women’s dignity and equality (Hunter-Henin 2012, 639). Such patriarchal views of dignity cannot be enforced where no categorical practical evidence suggests that the veil in most cases is “worn as a result of coercion” (Hunter-Henin 2012, 639).
The banning of the Muslim veil is the latest example of the kind of religious intolerance found in France today, although a look at France’s history regarding religious persecution following the French Revolution, anti-Semitism developed as another kind of intolerance toward religious minorities. The Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906) was the first true example of France responding to religious minorities within the blossoming nation (Silverstein 2018, 96). Both the Dreyfus Affair and banning of Muslim veil underlines the purposeful actions of the French and their decision to prioritize the Republic before all else while cultivating a climate of Islamophobia as they go along.
France & Islam’s Future
France, though viewed as a Christian-heritage society, shows a virtual absence of religious practice in the state as of today (Adida 2016, 80). According to a 2016 Institut Montaigne survey, 39.6% of French people claim no religion at all. Slightly more than half (51.1%) identify as Christian, 5.6% identify as Muslim, and less than 1% identify as Jewish (Religious Demographics Of France, 2016). A Pew Research Study of Islam in Europe claim a higher estimated 8.8% Muslim population than the estimate from Institut Montaigne and would be the highest percentage of Muslims in Europe. The Muslim population is expected to continue growing in France due to relocation, conversion, and high rates of environmental increase. Immigration has become an important political issue in France, and this will likely continue moving forward (Religious Demographics Of France, 2016).
Islamophobia in France is not merely a result of French society’s blatant disregard for its Muslim population; rather, Islamophobia represents a stark difference of ideologies and conflicting identities (Maxwell 2014, 155). While the future of anti-Islamic attitudes in France remains uncertain, the curve of the body politic will conclude whether Islamophobia in France continues. In a 2012 survey conducted by the French newspaper Le Figaro, a sample of 1,736 from the French population were asked whether people of Muslim origin were “well integrated” in French society (Adida 2016, 79).
Two-thirds of the respondents answered “no.” Respondents were then asked whether French society was sufficiently open in welcoming Muslims. Here 69% answered “yes,” meaning that the French majority shifts the blame for the lack of Muslim integration in France on Muslims themselves (Adida 2016, 79). While respondents could give several answers as to the reason for this failure to integrate successfully, Muslims’ “refusal to integrate themselves” was garnered the largest share (68%) of respondents approval (Adida 2016, 79).
Conclusion
The French Constitution deems that all persons within France honor French identity above any other ethnic, cultural, racial, or religious identities they may hold. This integration is meant to assist non-nationals in shedding their distinct identities in order to better assimilate into French cultural uniformity. This assimilationist model is exclusory, treating non-French philosophies as illegitimate entities. Individuals observing religions other than Catholicism in France have mostly been classified as outsiders. This élite mentality within French society has emphasized the importance of maintaining the people’s alignment with the state. France’s intolerant nature today stems from the desire to preserve a standardized national identity. This desire for an ostensible French nation has resulted in the marginalization of religious groups from France.
References
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