The american president and the United States congress have played 2 important roles throughout history. One is three constitutional role as expressed in the UNited States constitution and the constitution as a whole. Second is the political role. The 2 branches have occupied over the course of history. However as featured in the United states constitution these roles is the mechanisms of checks and balances which in pat could constrain their power. Therefore this essay will assess both constriction and political roles of the branches. Together with the various constraints that bound within the government inside and outside the branches that limit their powers
Assessing the Influence of the Constitutional and Political Roles of the American Presidency Studies on the constitutional and political roles of the American president often contain three ideas. The first is that the president lacks the ability to support a stable democratic system.
The second is that presidentialism gives excessive power to the President or, at the others governmental figures configures it as a weak magistracy incapable of printing coherence to the functioning of the political regime. The third is that parliamentary or semi-presidentialism constitutes a better alternative for the construction of effective democracy in America. In principle, the constitutional order can be configured, in regard to the subjects subject to regulation, in two different and opposite ways: with reservation of matters of the law or without reservation of matters of the law.
127 our experts are availableright now
If there is max legal power of legislative power is reduced, which limits is their power of what they want in a positive way.The reduction derived from the maximum legal domain benefits the President by the broadening of his regulatory power in all those matters that are not proper to the law. “This benefit results in a certain increase in its power of positive agenda, which although it does not say a direct relationship with the law, gives it regulatory action options not subject to parliamentary debate and approval” (Tulis, 283-313).
If the legal domain lacks people, the power of positive govermental agenda is stronger. In use of their constitutional powers, congressmen can promote bills in any area of their political, economic, social, or cultural interest. In comparative terms, the President loses, because he must share his power of positive agenda with congress who can initiate projects in everything they deem pertinent, even invading fields that the Executive Power considers as their own.
A second relevant aspect for the question analyzed is the creation by constitutional order of an initiative reserve on specific contents for the benefit of the President or the congressmen. Their constitutional recognition, directly related to the existence or absence of a maximum legal domain, has great relevance in the power of the beneficiary 39;s positive agenda, especially due to the exclusion effect of the remaining subjects endowed with initiative (Walton, 45-90).
Constitutional and Political Roles of the American Presidency The United States constitutes a federal constitutional republic with a presidential regime as a form of government based on the separation of powers into three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. What does each of these terms consist of? Federalism is the political system by which government functions are divided between central power and associated states.
The Federal Government exclusively exercises the minimum and indispensable powers to guarantee the political and economic unity of the nation, in matters such as foreign policy and defense, as opposed to systems based on a unitary or centralized state. The remaining powers correspond to the federated states or are exercised in a coordinated manner at both levels of government, as in the case of education policy. under federal power is the power of the states and after them, the local power, which takes many forms and has the county as a basic administrative unit. For its management, each state has an elected governor and its own legislature (Robertson, 56-87).
In the same argument, Riggs argues that since 1945 thirty third world countries with presidential constitutions have suffered coups, without any being able to exhibit an uninterrupted sequence of presidential and parliamentary elections.(McKay, 267-288). This data contrasts with the forty-three third world countries that have adopted parliamentarism, of which only thirteen have suffered an institutional breakdown. Arturo Valenzuela, citing Scott Palmer, points out that between 1930 and 1980, in the thirty-seven countries of Latin America two hundred seventy- seven changes of government take place, of which 37.5% have their origin in a military coup d’etat6. The same author observes that since 1980, although the rate of military interventions decreases (in symmetry with the changes derived from the end of the cold war), the interruption and early termination of the presidential mandate remains a relevant figure in American presidentialism (McKay, 297-298).
The cabinet is very important to the success of the president being able to assist him with is goals.They advise the President on any subject he needs there help with relating to the duties of each member’s respective office.
The problems of presidentialism in sustaining a democratic regime can be explained in two ways. The first is the one who understands that the problem has its origin in three structural or characteristic deficiencies of the design of any presidentialism: the temporal rigidity of the Lares mandates, the dominant majority tendency in the presidency, and the dual democratic legitimacy.
These three elements would significantly condition the relationship between the President and the Assembly, generating a confrontational tension that encourages the mutual block between powers. Rules committee powerful and can obstruct a bill if they don’t like it and sets up the rules on how a bill will be discussed. Can also issue a special rule prohibiting amendments to the bill. (notes)
The second, together with stressing the difficulty of comparing political regimes with different history, institutions and economics, argues that the problem does not arise exclusively from structural conditions but rather from particular provisions that encourage or discourage the collaboration of powers. The merit of this thesis is that it allows us to account for the functioning of some presidentialism beyond democratic survival based on historical and political factors linked to the electoral system and the party system that it fosters.
The two theses indicated constitute the gateway to the particular analysis of any aspect of the functioning of presidentialism. If the first explanation is accepted, the particular study must be inserted in the logic of structural defects, in order to understand its meaning in the functioning of democracy.
If the second explanation is accepted, the particular study of essential provisions of presidentialism discover defects but also merits in its impact on the democratic regime. Without prejudice that the work will run on the basis of this second look, we will expose the central elements of the first thesis (Hirschfield, 99-109). Constraints on the Chief Executive in Terms of his Formulation and Implementation of Public
The three problems indicated do not fully explain the poor result exhibited by the chief executive as an institutional order of democracy, nor do they serve to understand its good or satisfactory performance.
There are even those who, like Cheihub, argue that the thesis of the defective institutional design does not explain this performance and that it is rather the conditions in which presidential democracies exist the determinants for their survival. However, without questioning the sensitive incidence of structural defects in the functioning of all presidential elections, it is possible to verify that they have different performance in terms of their ability to support an effective democratic regime. That is: despite its problems, the chief executive has demonstrated, in some countries, its ability to maintain an operational democracy and even face extremely adverse political circumstances (Pacelle, 87-198).
Understanding that one of the countries in which the chief executive has managed to keep the democratic system running has been the United States. In America the chief executive, despite the widespread criticisms formulated to the constitutional powers granted to the President of the USA, has successfully endured twenty-five years of democracy, understood at least as a basic standard of operation. American democracy on a regular basis is recognized as a good democracy in comparative terms, and this is verified in some indices that attempt to measure its quality. If the good or satisfactory functioning of American democracy is admitted as a premise, this good functioning should be supported, institutionally, in the primacy of the President of the Republic over the National Congress in the exercise of legislative power.
Transactional leadership is a leadership that focuses on supervision, organization, and performance. “Transactional is when leaders promote compliance by followers through both rewards and punishments.Set goals, articulate explicit agreements regarding what the leader expects from organizational members and how they will be rewarded for their efforts and commitment, and provide constructive feedback to keep everybody on task’ (Vera & Crossan) they think inside the box when dealing with problems these types of leaders are very straightforward. transforaminal leader are very productive things different and goes for new ideas. Tries to make a change for the better.
The strength of the presidential powers envisaged by the Constitution should generate some primacy over the National Congress, and such primacy should explain the performance of our democratic regime.
However, this form of President-Congress relationship does not seem corroborated by the exercise of parliamentary powers by the opposition, since it would have to show in some clear and persistent rejection of parliamentary privileges or privileges that identify the aforementioned the chief executive reinforced. Moreover, given the predominance of periods of government divided after March 1990, a predictable political response to the use and abuse of the constitutional privileges of the President of the Republic should have been the blockage or slowdown of the parliamentary process of the presidential legislative program, what has not Happened.
Government war powers are important. This is how we decided when the united states armed forces get deployed overseas. The president will need to get approval from congress every 30 days for 90 days before issuing any type of combat.
Another possibility is that the presidential powers that make up the reinforcement of the chief executive elected by the current Constitution have, in their practical application, a smaller effect on the balance of powers, both by political factors and by legal factors. The lower Things of presidential powers bases that doctrine that maintains that the relationship between President and Congress is not dominated by the primacy of the former but by the cooperation or collaboration between both political powers.
This collaboration would better explain the influence of the National Congress in the American political system and, in particular, the significant participation of both houses in decisions relevant to the conduct and management of the government. This collaboration is what would allow the political interests of deputies and senators to have an impact and, eventually, be part of the presidential decisions (normative and non-normative) that are subject to the constitutional power of the National Congress. In turn, the presence of the political interests of parliamentarians in the decision-making processes has a favorable effect on the democratic system because it contributes to the adaptation and orientation of government policies to the public interest (Siegel, 177).
However, to maintain that there is a certain degree of collaboration between the Legislative Chambers and the President of America, it is necessary to identify the accepted or consented influence that these (and their members) exert in the decisions of the Executive Power. As long as this influence exists and has a relevant impact on the presidential outcome or decision, it is possible to affirm that a cooperative or collaborative relationship operates.
If such influence does not exist nor has no influence on the presidential decision, there is no relationship of cooperation, but mere primacy and such primacy is difficult to reconcile with a stable and sustainable democratic regime over time. Therefore, the degree of effective influence exerted by parliamentarians in the process of government covered by their constitutional powers is decisive in understanding the functioning of democracy in its institutional dimension. The foregoing places the effective participation of the latter in the decisions of the former at the center of the reflection on the Executive Power-Legislative Power relations.
The fulfillment of the government program that cemented the popular election of the President depends in large part on his legislative power, since the law is the vehicle for decision and implementation of public policies of greater economic, political and social importance. The foregoing gives the regulation of the legislative process an essential character for the proper functioning of the democratic system.
The legislative process contains mechanisms that allow the selection of motions and messages that will receive effective processing and, therefore, are more likely to generate a consensus that will make the law. The effective processing of a project begins with its admission, formal and material, to the so-called legislative agenda that only includes the initiatives that will receive study and debate in the Chamber and Commission, and that excludes those motions and messages that, once presented in The Office of the Parties of the chamber of origin does not advance nor will they advance in a relevant way in its legislative Process.
The power of the agenda is the power to include or exclude bills in the legislative agenda, as well as the power to decide the type of debate and voting procedure they will receive. The selection of the bills that will enter the legislative agenda is a central component of the agenda power (or agenda-setting). For both the President and for deputies and senators, influence and control over the legislative agenda constitute an essential component of their position in the political system. Cox and McCubbins argue that the main power of parliamentary groups or banks is precisely that of the agenda, even over the power of control over the vote of parliamentarians (Ellis, 76-128).
References
- Ellis, Richard J. The development of the American Presidency. Routledge, 2018.
- Hirschfield, Robert S. The Power of the Presidency: Concepts and Controversy. Routledge, 2017.
- McKay, David. American politics and society. John Wiley & Sons, 2017.
- Pacelle, Richard. The role of the Supreme Court in American politics: The least dangerous branch. Routledge, 2018.
- Robertson, David Brian. Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge, 2017.
- Siegel, Neil S. ‘Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump.’ Ind. LJ 93 (2018): 177.
- Tulis, Jeffrey. ‘On presidential character.’ The Presidency in the Constitutional Order. Routledge, 2017. 283-313.
- Walton, Hanes, Robert C. Smith, and Sherri L. Wallace. American politics and the African American quest for universal freedom. Routledge, 2017.
