The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 led to the death of approximately 800,000 Tutsi people, killed by the Hutu militia. Several causes contributed to the ignition of this war, one of which was the dehumanization of the Tutsi by the Hutu. A Hutu newspaper called Kangura published various hateful articles against the Tutsi. There were also twenty other newspaper which spread propaganda against Tutsis throughout the nation. This bred the growth of extremist militias such as the Interahamwe organized by the ruling MRND party and the Impuzamugambi organized by the CRD, a party that advocated for Hutu power. These militias received training in the Rwandese government military camps and received various weapons from the government.
There existed a severe lack of effort by the Rwandese government and international stakeholders to stop the injustices. The government failed to act when various moderate Hutus were murdered by militias. The international community also failed to act when Tutsi civilians were murdered by Hutu militias in 1990, 1991 and 1992. The Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) also played a role in causing the genocide. The group challenged the Hutu led Rwandese government and initiated military action from 1990 to control various parts of Rwanda. Both groups failed to agree on any peace agreements.
Many good people, states, and institutions agreed to do nothing in the face of mass murder. This was achieved by a simple denial of facts. Various stakeholders failed to prevent the mass killing by denying that there was going to be genocide. Many nations such as the United States ignored information of an impending genocide and argued that it was just a conflict between two tribes where neither had the ability to commit mass murder. The Genocide Convention requires countries to act to stop an impending mass killing. However various states decided to avoid using the word “genocide” so that they would not be forced to act.
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The United States and the United Kingdom wanted the UN Security Council to avoid using the word. The two nations assumed that a civil war was going on in Rwanda which involved the fighting of two tribes. Most human rights groups and the press also failed to recognize that there was a genocide going on. One factor that delayed the response of the various states was that they did not want to participate in the war. The United States had faced heavy casualties as it initiated military action to stop the civil war in Somalia and were keen to avoid another intervention in Africa. The lack of resources also affected the response to the genocide. The UN was also culpable due to their delay to act, not to mention failed to deploy some of its forces to end the conflict.
When the UN interventions to prevent the genocide were finally initiated, their request for heavy weapons and troops to stop the killings was not granted. Almost all international actors were culpable for the genocide though eventually some joined initiatives that saved the lives of thousands of people. Only 456 UN peacekeepers were on the ground, but this small number of soldiers still managed to save 25,000 lives. Other nations that failed to stop the genocide include France and Belgium. France sent in French and Senegalese troops who were able to save more than 10,000 civilians. Belgium deployed 420 soldiers however they were withdrawn after ten of them were killed while guarding the Rwandese Prime Minister.
The media played a role in both the warning and fueling the war. The Rwandese press was responsible for feeding the hate against the Tutsi. The media spread propaganda about the ethnic group claiming that they were not indigenous to Rwanda and that they ate Hutu people. Calling the Tutsi various names such as “snakes”, the Rwandese radio and newspaper media outlets successfully spread propaganda discouraging the Hutu people from having mercy on the Tutsi. Since the media was supported by the Rwandese government, their statements seemed like official communication, and it encouraged many people to join the massacre. The Western media largely ignored the genocide when covered by the press omitting the word “genocide“ however, later some French newspapers such as Liberation and Le Monde did highlight what was going on in Rwanda and termed the atrocities as genocide.
The United States created the Atrocities Prevention Board in 2002 to improve its capacity to handle cases that require quick response. Also, the UN member states accepted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. This agreement provides nations with the responsibility to protect their populations from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and genocide. The R2P also authorizes countries to take collective actions to protect citizens of a nation in case peaceful methods fail in the event that the state fails to protect its citizens or acts as an aggressor. The R2P was accepted to avert failures in the 1990s where countries failed to act immediately to save populations affected by genocides, though the R2P did not seem to change the desirability of states for humanitarian intervention since national interests are still considered to be more important. Various nations have enhanced compliance with the R2P by building institutions that can enable quick response to mass murders. Currently, the United States and countries in Europe are increasingly focusing their energy on domestic problems as opposed to international interventions. There is a rise of anti-globalization, nationalism, and populism which make it difficult for governments to justify the investment of resources in preventing atrocities in foreign countries.
International forces have failed to act in various conflicts as they have adopted a bystander policy. Various patterns and conditions trigger a behavior of not intervening. They include disagreements on the legitimacy of using force in an intervention. There have been disagreements between nations on whether R2P should be invoked while dealing with mass killings. An example of this is the lack of consensus on responding conflicts in Syria by habitual allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Another factor that makes it difficult for nations to confront mass atrocities is domestic constraints. Government interventions are influenced by popular opinions and it can be difficult for nations to dedicate resources to the invasion of other countries if their own population is against the move.
The churches, statesmen, and NGOs were not different from others in dealing with the Rwandan crisis. Many churches were complicit in the crimes that were committed in the country keeping silent and not voicing their disapproval of the ethnic divisions that were occurring in the country. Although, in some cases, the church organized various efforts to end the war in the country. The Christian organizations created a Contact Committee to enable mediation of political differences. The committee opened talks for the creation of a multiparty government in 1992. It also organized a march on the eve of the genocide. However, these efforts were minimal, and in most cases, the church was silent.
Reference List
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