“Great Game” is an innocuous word used to describe the conflict between Russia and Britain for control in Central Asia in the 1830s. The Great Game was not only restricted to Afghanistan but expanded to entire of Eurasia. For Russia, it was considered to be a ‘jewel on its’ crown’ and for Britain a prominent trade/commercial route. The entire scenario was a mixture of battle for commerce and diplomatic maneuvering. In an attempt to gain control, there came about four wars between Britain and Afghanistan. Although Britain suffered a mortifying loss, Afghanistan was treated as a ‘neutral zone’ between the Britain and Russia. In the Anglo-Russian Convention held in 1907, both the countries developed an agreement separating the country to northern and southern zones controlled by Russia and Britain respectively.
The New Great Game is deuxième part of a battle which now has multiple players. As Bhairvi Tandon suggests, Afghanistan has always been viewed as an area of geo-strategic importance in Central Asia. Russia has a hand in it due to its’ interest in curbing terrorism to ensure it does not affect the Russian caucuses on one side, and to ensure adequate restrictions on the borders for trade in opium which happens to be the prime source of income for the Taliban. China’s interest in Afghanistan is due to two reasons. Firstly, it does not want to be surrounded by regional alliances superior/global power. Secondly, to ensure that it has adequate safety from terrorism, to avoid spill over of its’ influence in the Xinjiang region of China.
In order to ensure cordial relations, it is necessary to take into consideration the presence of foreign military power in the region. The One Belt One Road Initiative adds to its’ reasons of interest in the nation. Pakistan has been a significant player in controlling the Taliban regime to have adequate influence over the country as compared to India. Pakistan has historical, ethnic, linguistic relations with Afghanistan and relies on hard power and military as a means of developing a relationship. USA’s interest in Afghanistan only increased due to 9/11. Central-Asia is a landlocked area and Afghanistan can provide a means of access, which is required by India. The occurrence and continuance of the New Great Game here shall depend upon the implementation of the peace deal which is underway.
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Although the nation has multiple interests, this paper will mainly focus on the history of Afghanistan and India’s’ relationship as a means to understand implications on India if the Taliban or Afghan-led government comes in force in 2020.
The history of Afghanistan is complicated consisting of two invasions by British, one by the Soviet Union due to mujahedeen, allowing Taliban to come into power followed by US invasion (essentially a siege) and of the largest magnitude, political unrest which has been an on-going event since 2004 parliamentary elections, which was one of its kind occurring after 30 years.
India’s motives for a strong Indo-Afghan relationship lies in one of its’ prime goal to prevent inclination towards Islam extremism in Central-Asia, represented by Taliban, which is in line with the goal of the Afghan led government as well as the international community, and to prevent reduction, if not increase its’ influence over Afghanistan in comparison to Pakistan. In addition, in the last few years, Trumps’ administration has ameliorated the strategic importance of India’s involvement, requiring New Delhi to contribute more to Kabul in the form of economic and infrastructure.
As Vinay Kaura mentions in the Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, the relationship between India and Afghanistan has 3 phases. The first one is from the time of Independence (1947) to the end of Cold War (1991) where India had an amicable relationship with an exception of intrusion by Soviet Union (1979), when India took a neutral stance due to its’ relationship with USSR. The second phase begins form the end of Cold War in 1991 and continues till the antagonistic Taliban government is overthrown in 2001. This time saw a strained relationship due to Islamic extremism, terrorism and the Kashmir issue. It was also because the country was run by Pakistan backed Taliban.
After 2001, India’s relationship has improved. Over the last few years, India has tried to maintain and develop relations with Afghanistan through means of soft power. It has tried to rely to donations to develop education and health, cricket, culture and has contributed to the infrastructure to build a relationship and earn its’ goodwill. Furthermore, under the Strategic Partnership Agreement, it has provided it with funds for economic and infrastructural improvements. A major project in Afghanistan includes funding for Afghan-India Friendship Dam which shall provide opportunities with the functioning of the Chabahar port.
The relations between Afghanistan and India relationship after the establishment of National Unity Government (2014) also underwent three phases. In the first phase Kabul inclined towards Islamabad in order to promote constraining of terrorism and declining provision of safe havens for terrorists to combat Jihadism and Islam extremists. This phase saw innumerable interactions between the two nations.
The second phase depicted inclination of Kabul towards New Delhi due to failure of Islamabad to bring Taliban to the table for a peace process. This was followed by the last phase wherein the Afghan Government supported India’s effort in promotion of it’s’ objectives. This was also the time when India’s stance of providing only non-lethal equipment to Afghanistan also changed with Prime Minister Modi’s visit in December 2015, where he inaugurated a new Parliament and also provided them with four Mi-25 helicopters.
In fact, this was the time when Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also declined Islamabads’ donation of $500 million stating that “If we are allowed to live peacefully we can find $500 million and if there is peace for five years we would be in a situation to give others $500 million”. Pakistans’ involvement in promotion of Taliban led government has significantly increased, which remained a cause for worry for Kabul. In the end, the National Unity Government remained, as the International Crisis group suggests “shaky” and unstable due to internal disagreements between President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah.
The peace deal initiated by the US government with Afghanistan was with the Taliban and excluded the Afghan government though they were required for the purpose of releasing the prisoners. This also depicts the orchestrated reduction in bargaining power for the Afghan-led government. The agreement with the Taliban includes reduction of violence, assurance of deterrence of terrorism support in Afghanistan, initiation of Intra-Afghan peace talks and withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. It is also worth mentioning that the peace deal refers to Taliban as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban”, which gives it an equal recognition juxtaposing it to the Afghan government.
United States invaded Afghanistan after 9/11. Under the Bush government, their primary goals were considered to disrupt terrorism and promoting development of a stable government in Afghanistan. In the words of President Bush, ‘We have a strategic interest and I believe a moral interest in a prosperous and peaceful democratic Afghanistan, and no matter how long it takes, we will help the people of Afghanistan succeed.” But the current scenario also bleaks the contention behind Washington’s’ reason for entering into an agreement- was it to promote development of state government or to find a means to prevent an ignominious exit to it’s troops.
The only way a Great game, with India’s substantial involvement will not take place, is in case of a reconciled Taliban. A reconciled Taliban does not mean cajoling the Taliban to ensure peace. It means a government with adequate representation of the Taliban in the government. This is to eradicate what Taliban believes is “winning” in the nation. But the prime question that comes out here is what government? The elections of September 2019 declared Ashraf Ghani as the President with 1 million votes out of 10 million who voted. This led to agony by Abdullah Abdullah who created a parallel government. While many countries struggle to create one effective government, the nation, in abundance, has two (although not efficient).
The peace deal does not provide details of formation of coalition in forming members of the parliament which only increases the feud. Ending of this estrangement also means strengthening of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)’s to counter insurgency. Although the report released by Congressional Research Service updated on 11th March, states that the current strength of ANDSF is about 273,000 and the Taliban is 60,000, it is also states that 45,000 of ANDSF personnel have lost lives in less than 5 years, while nothing that “Taliban have achieved some notable military successes and the group is seen as more cohesive and less susceptible to fragmentation than in the past.” Reconciliation will furthermore require recognition of different ethnic groups within the Taiban, which also means accepting that for a lot of them, it is a way of life. It also means Taliban will cut off ties Jihad terrorists groups in order to promote development of its’ own nation.
Although this seems like an idealistic approach on an international front, recent events only provoke us to be realistic. The attacks conducted by the Taliban on 2nd March at the football match in Kotch only provide us with a peek of what might be ahead of us. In addition, the recent attacks by Taliban on Kabul amidst coronavirus attack provide a glimpse of what might be ahead of us if it comes to power. The Indian Express provides a statement by Naqibullah Faiq “During the day, we fight coronavirus. At night, our brothers, the Taliban. In the morning, we hold meetings on coronavirus. In the afternoon, on security”.
As per Aljazeera, Taliban controlled 14.5% of its districts in January 2018. This was claimed to be increased to 18% in 2020, mentions the Council on Foreign Relations, which also states that Taliban is now stronger than even. What is happening right now is no cataclysm. It is a vacuum created by the exit of US administration. Although a reconciled Taliban might seem consummating, it does not seem rational.
This puts in jeopardy India’s’ position including its goodwill. The underlying issue being the amount of investment in Afghanistan. India has spent a huge amount in it’s development, not only to earn its’ goodwill but also to promote development of the nation. The events after the peace deal do not put India in a propitious position in this regard. As indicated by India Today, India has spent over $ 2 billion in infrastructure, out of the total of $ 3 billion the war-led nation. With the announcement of peace-deal, its officials indicate that the nation shall continue to provide funds, aspiring for peace and stability. However, the implications are dismal.
Equally important, if not most critical and the obvious concern, is that of terrorism. The peace deal includes “enforcement mechanisms that will prevent the use of the soil of Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States and its allies”. However, it is still unclear on whether “ally” shall include India. If not, India has to fear for recrudescence rise of Islamic extremism and jihadism, which requires considerable increase in security and diplomacy from it’s’ side.
Another concern is that of trade. India, under the North-South Transport Corridor framework, had entered into an agreement for the development and usage of Chabahar port in Iran, which connects it to Central-Asia through Afghanistan. This agreement (which is over 17 years old) aimed at ensuring adequate access in the absence of ingress from the Pakistan government, proved as a suitable alternative. India will now be required to keep a keen eye towards its’ accessibility amidst the peace deal.
Another concerns is its sovereign rights over Pakistan controlled Kashmir. Pakistan has, in the past tried to link Kashmir issue with Afghanistan. After 9/11 when the US set up military base in Afghanistan, India set up military base and medical centers in Tajikistan to establish influence over Afghanistan. This is because India’s fate over Kashmir and its goal to control or minimize terrorism depends on the Islamic extremist movements in the neighboring areas. After the abrogation of Section 370, although Spokesman of Taliban, Zabihullah Mujahid previously issued a statement that linking of Kashmir issue will not improve the crisis; it is quite possible that the issue will be bought up again. As Economic Times mentioned, the issue shall be cause by the Jihadi structure in Pakistan.
This also means that India must ensure that its’ conversations now, cannot only be restricted to Afghan government but must extend to Taliban government. This only puts into jeopardy the hostile environment and disagreements with Pakistan, due to its’ influence over Taliban. This shift can be seen since 2018, when India, in unofficial capacity, sent Amar Sinha, former envoy to Afghanistan, and TCA Raghavan, former Indian high commissioner to Moscow for the Afghanistan peace talks. As the official peace deal was being signed on February 29, 2020, India sent, as First Post writes, “a serving Indian diplomat to be in the same room as Taliban representatives for the first time since 2001”.
If the Afghan-led government and the Taliban do manage to reconcile to form a representative parliament, it shall be favorable, not only to them, but also to the international community. The country shall have a blip of hope to continue with developmental proceedings and the violence shall be controlled. India shall have an upper-hand in terms of trade as construction of Chabahar port will look likely. The fight against terrorism, although not lost, shall continue.
Every country having a card in this deck, bargains only for its’ own interest, apathetic towards that of Afghanistan’s real problems. All the countries remain to stay intransigent. It is safe to say that India shall do nothing less of the same. After analyzing the situation and the occurrences after the formal initiation of the peace process, it is important to not have a myopic view. It is an understatement to say that India is required to secure its parameters and improve its relations with other countries wary of Jihadism. As Indrani Bagchi promptly highlights in Economic Times “We should hope for the best, but prepare for the worst”. With possible terrorism at large, it is not just one country which has to face fight against it, but it is the entire international community, which should be prepared to be at peace with war.
