This paper presents a similar phenomenon [to viewing a Rorschach inkblot] with respect to moral judgement, describing two moral perspectives that organize thinking in different ways. The analogy to ambiguous figure perception arises from the observation that although people are aware of both perspectives, they tend to adopt one or the other in defining and resolving moral conflict….. In describing an alternative standpoint, I will reconstruct the account of moral development around two moral perspectives, grounded in different dimensions of relationship that give rise to moral concern. The justice perspective, often equated with moral reasoning, is recast as one way of seeing moral problems and as a care perspective is brought forward as an alternate vision or frame. (Gilligan 1)
How does one make a moral decision? Carol Gilligan’s 1987 “Moral Orientation and Moral Development” explains how a person would choose one direction or another when faced with an ethical problem, by defining the two types of moral thought, justice perspective and care perspective. Gilligan asserts that in the research provided in her paper, one can deduce that moral reasoning is a narrow line that is very often danced over in the efforts to understand what makes one decide to use the core principles of justice or care in making an ethical choice.
“Moral Orientation” sets a clear understanding of what justice perspective is, what sets it apart from its counterpart care perspective, and how a person could come to use each of these forms of moral reasoning when faced with an ethical problem. But ultimately, Gilligan leaves her audience with an ambiguous conclusion, in that she explains the importance of knowing that both thought patterns are prevalent, and that they can be found often intertwined.
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Carol Gilligan defines two types of moral reasoning that helps one understand how moral decisions are made, called justice perspective and care perspective. Justice perspective, which Gilligan also refers to as moral reasoning, is the view in which one applies the concept of justice, responsibility, and dependence to the self (Gilligan 3). Justice perspective calls upon one to see the situation as a choice of the individual’s relationship with regards to what is right and wrong, what is defensible. By distinction, care perspective is the mode of thought in which one applies equality and fairness to others in relationship to themselves (Gilligan 3).
Care perspective asks the individual what the consequences of the action would be to the surrounding people involved, and how that would in turn be objective to them? At first, one would think the two ways of thought as night-and-day opposites, and to that point, Gilligan writes “theoretically, the distinction between justice and care cuts across the familiar divisions between thinking and feeling, egoism and altruism, theoretical and practical reasoning” (3). But later in “Moral Orientation and Moral Development” the two thought processes become very closely linked.
Gilligan introduces a twist in the story as she proposes the idea that justice perspective and care perspective might not be so different after all. To this, she claims that quite often people make moral judgments based on personal experiences with the use of both care and justice perspectives, an idea known as object relations theory. “Thus, object-relations theory sustains a series of oppositions that have been central in Western thought and moral theory, including the opposition between thought and feelings, self and relationship, reason and compassion, justice
and love” (9). With this, justice perspective’s rigid, moral basis of thought mixes with the softer, emotional backing of care perspective, and fuses in a way that gives the person a way to decide with both perspectives in play, calling on their previous life events. Now, the two once clearly-separated modes of thought have become interchangeable, as Carol Gilligan further clarifies:
“To trace moral development along two distinct although intersecting dimensions of relationship suggests the possibility of different permutations of justice and care reasoning, different ways these two moral perspectives can be understood and represented in relation to one another. For example, one perspective may overshadow or eclipse the other, so that one is brightly illuminated while the other is dimly remembered, familiar but for the most part forgotten” (11).
As one can see, the two are now mixable ideas to Gilligan in regards to moral reasoning. It would appear that the most-logical conclusion one could deduce in asking how does one make a moral judgment is to say that the person employs both forms of thought. Further it would make the most sense to make use of the two perspectives, and trust that self-judgment will know what to do based on the circumstances given.
References
- Gilligan, Carol., et al. “Different voices or perfect storm: Why are there so few women leaders?.” Psychology of Women Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4, Dec. 2001.
- Paz-Aparicio, Montserrat., et al. “Moral reasoning and its relationship with distress in nursing students: A descriptive correlational study.” Nurse Education Today, vol. 20, no. 1, Jan. 2000.
